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[L. A. No. 26266. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1961.]

S. D. CAPLAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. KENNETH O. SCHROEDER et al, Defendants and Ap. pellants.
[1] Vendor and Purchaser- Oonstruction and Operation of Oontract.-Where plaintiffs, pursuant to an agreement to buy land
owned by defendants, delivered their promissory note outside
escrow, and the parties agreed that an escrow should be opened,
that plaintiffs would pay an additional sum in cash, assume
existing notes secured by trust deeds and execute a note secured by a new trust deed for the balance, and where plaintitIs paid the note when due but refused to complete the purchase and defendants terminated the escrow, plaintiffs entered
into a mutually binding contract that could be specifically
enforced against them and they executed and paid the note in
part performance of that contract. Under these circumstances
a mere recitation in the contract that, if the sale was not consummated by reason of some default of the buyers, the note
or moneys received in payment should be retained by the sellers
as agreed consideration for the agreement was insufficient to
establish "meaningful separate consideration," since defendants executed the contract, not in exchange for the note and
its payment alone, but in consideration of plaintiffs' agreement
to purchase the property on all the terms stated.
[2] ld.-Forfeiture of Purchaser's lnterest.-Where it is only because of the purchasers' default in completing the purchase
under a contraet to buy realty that the vendors are given the
right to retain payments made on a promissory note executed
by the purchasers, a provision giving that right is one "by
which the amount of damage to be paid, or other compensation
to be made, for a brench of an obligation, is determined in
anticipation thereof" (Civ. Code, § 1670), and it is therefore
void unless it falls within the exception, stated in Civ. Code,
§ 1671, of impracticability or extreme difficulty in fixing the
actual damage.
[3] ld.-Recovery by Purchaser of Payments or Deposits.-Even
a willfully default.ing vendee may recover the excess of his
part pnYIIll'nts ove:>r the:> damages caused by his breach.
[1] See Oal.J'ur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 7 et seq.; Am.J'ur.,
Vendor and Purchaser, § 5 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 97, 101;
[2] Vendor and Purchaser, § 127; [3, 7] Vendor and Purchaser,
§ 334; [4-6] DIlUlages, § 133; [8] Dallluges, § 38.
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[4] Da.mages-Liquidated Damages-ILeal Estate Transactions.A provision for retention of a reasonable down payment as
liquidated damages in a contract for the sale of real property
is presumptively valid.
[6] leL - Liquidated Damages -Real Estate Transactions. - The
evidence did not establish as a matter of law that a provision
for retention of a promissory note executed by purchasers of
realty was for liquidated damages where, though the labels
adopted by the parties were not conclusive, the parties provided
for liquidated damages in the event of a breach by the vendors
but did not 80 describe the right to retain the note in the event
of a breach by the purchasers, nor provide that the retention
and collection of the note should be the exclusive remedy in
damages against them.
[6] Id.-Liquidated Damages-Real Estate Transactions.-Though
the amount of a promissory note executed by the purchasers
under a realty contract was less than 5 per cent of the purchase price and there was evidence that, at the time the contract was made, "it would be impracticable or extremely dimeult to fix the actual damage" (Civ. Code, § 1671), where there
was other evidence that the value of the land was expected to
increase with the passage of time and it might be inferred
that the parties did not contemplate that the vendors would
suffer any damage if they were subsequently required to resell
their property and that the amount of the note did not represent a reasonable endeavor to estimate probable damages in
the event of the purchasers' breach, whether the parties intended the provision for retention of the note to be for liquidated damages to the exclusion of the damages that would
otherwise be recoverable and, if so, whether the requirements
of Civ. Code, § 1671, were met, were questions of fact that it
was incumbent on the vendors to present to the trial court
for resolution.
[7] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery by Purchaser of Payments
or Deposits-Deduetions.-Defaulting purchasers who were entitled under a realty contract to the amount paid by them on
a promissory note could not complain that, since the vendors
resold the property without the assistance of a broker, the
vendors were saved the expense of a second broker's fee and
should not be allowed to deduct the broker's fee for the first
sale from the amount paid by the purchasers on the note,
since the vendors, not the purchasers, were entitled to the
benefit of any savings the vendors e1Iected by reselling their
property without the assistance of a broker.
[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 212; Am.Jur., Damages, §§ 258,
260.
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[8] Damages-Interest.-In an action to recover money paid, plus
damages, under a contract to buy real property, where the
value of the property on which the extent of damages depended
was not certain and could not be made certain by calculation,
interest did not become payable until the parties stipulated to
that value after the action was commenced, and the court erred,
not in failing to award interest from the date the escrow was
closed, but in awarding it from the date the action was brought.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County. Raymond Thompson, Judge. Modified and
affirmed.
Action to recover money paid, plus damages, under a contract to buy real property. Judgment for plaintiffs for
amount paid, less certain expenses incurred by defendants,
modified and affirmed.
LE'on J. Alexander and Alexander, Inman & Fine for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Carl C. Cowles, Rimel & Johnston and Fred D. Johnston
for Defendants and Appellants.
TRAYNOR, J.-On July 12,1955, plaintiffs agreed to buy
and defendants agreed to sell approximately 147 acres of land
in Orange County for $2,200 an acre or approximately
$323,000. Pursuant to the contract plaintiffs delivered to defendants outside of escrow their promissory note for $15,000,
payable with interest in two equal installments due in three
months and six months from the date of the agreement. The
parties agreed that an escrow should be opened within ten
days and closed within six months and that plaintiffs would
pay an additional $85,000 in cash, assume existing notes
secured by deeds of trust for approximately $80,000, and
execute a note secured by a new deed of trust for the balance.
Plaintiffs paid the $15,000 note with interest when due but
refused to complete the purchase, and defendants terminated
the escrow. Within the following year defendants sold the
property to others at a somewhat higher price than they had
agreed to sell it to plaintiffs.
In January 1958 plaintiffs brought this action to recover
the amount they had paid plus damages, alleging that defendants had brcached the contract. In the event that the court
should find that plaintiffs breached the contract, they sought
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restitution of the amount paid less any damages suffered by
defendants. Before trial it was stipulated that plaintiffs willfully breached the contract and that at all material times the
value of the property was equal to the contract price of
$2,200 per acre. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs were
entitled to restitution of the amount paid less certain expenses
incurred by defendants and entered judgment for the difference of $13,032.75 plus interests and costs. Both plaintiffs and
defendants appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in allowing defendants a deduction for the broker's fee paid by them and
in awarding interest from the date the action was brought
instead of from the date the escrow was terminated. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in holding invalid the
contract provision permitting them to retain the amount paid.
The contract provided that plaintiffs" as BUYERS will make,
execute and deliver to the SELLERS their promissory note for
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) payable Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) on or before three
months after the date of this Agreement, and the balance
of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) on or
before six months from and after the date of this Agreement,
with interest from the date of this Agreement until paid at
the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum. This note shall
be delivered to the SELLERS outside of escrow and is given to
SELLERS as consideration for SELLERS entering into this Agreement, but when said note is paid according to the tenor thereof the BUYERS shall have credit for the principal sum thereof,
to wit: $15,000.00, against the purchase price of the said real
property, if the sale of said real property is consummated, at
the time and in the manner herein set forth. If said purchase
and sale is not so consummated because of a default on the
part of the SELLERS, then said note shall be returned to the
BUYERS, or if any money has been paid on said note the sum
paid shall be refunded to the BUYERS j and if the SELLERS'
default is wilful SELLERS will pay BUYERS the sum of $5,000.00
as liquidated damages. If, however, the sale is not consummated by reason of some default of the BUYERS, said note
and/or the moneys received in payment thereof shall be
retained and collected by the SELLERS as agreed consideration
for entering into this Agreement. "
[1] Defendants contend that under this provision the
execution and payment of the note were separate consideration for their entering into the agreement, and that since they
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did so, plaintiffs have received what they bargained for and
are not entitled to restitution of any part of the payments.
We cannot agree with this contention. Entering into an agreement is meaningless except as rights and obligations flow
therefrom, and we must therefore look to those rights and
obligations to determine whether an initial payment is sup·ported by separate consideration. In the present case plaintiffs did not secure an option to purchase or not as they
pleased; they entered into a mutually binding contract that
could be specifically enforced against them, and they executed
and paid the note in part performance of that contract. Under
these circumstances the "mere recitation that the right of the
seller to retain this deposit was in consideration for executing
this agreement, is insufficient to establish meaningful separate
consideration." (Rodriguez v. Barnett, 52 Ca1.2d 154, 160
[338 P.2d 907] ; see also Estate of Williamson, 150 Cal.App.2d
334, 336-337 [310 P.2d 77].) Nor does the evidence and finding that the parties meant what they said by their recitation
establish "meaningful separate consideration," for defendants executed the agreement, not in exchange for the note
and its payment alone, but in consideration of plaintiffs'
agreement to purchase the property on all of the terms stated.
[a] Since it is only because of plaintiffs' default in
completing the purchase that defendants are given the right
under the agreement to retain the payments made on the
note, plaintiffs correctly contend that the provision giving
that right is one "by which the amount of damage to be paid,
or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof." (Civ. Code,
§ 1670.) It is therefore void unless it falls within the exception stated in Civil Code section 167V
[3] In Freedman v. Rector, Wardens etc. of 8t. Matthias
Parish, 37 Ca1.2d 16 [230 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1], we held
that even a willfully defaulting vendee may recover the excess
of his part payments over the damages caused by his breach.
(See also Estate of Mesncr, 37 Ca1.2d 563, 567 [233 P.2d 551] ;
Bi"d v. Kenworthy, 43 Ca1.2d 656, 659-660 [277 P.2d 1];
Estatc of Williamson, 150 Ca1.App.2d 334, 337 [310 P.2d 77] ;
Pasteur Realty Corp. v. LaFleur, 154 Ca1.App.2d 5, 9 [315
P.2d 374].) [4] We also pointed out that a provision for
.. , The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount which
shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage."
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the retention of a reasonable down payment as liquidated
damages in a contract for the sale of real property is presumptively valid. (37 Cal.2d at p. 23; see also Wright v.
Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 142-143 [243 P. 866]; Civ. Code,
§ 3387; 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1133, pp. 602-603.) In
the present case, however, defendants did not seek to sustain
the provision for the retention of the note in the trial court on
thE' theory that it was a provision for liquidated damages, and
they have not advanced that theory on appeal. [6] Moreover,
the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the
provision was one for liquidated damages. Although the labels
adopted by the parties are not conclusive (Dyer Bros. Golden
West Iron Works v. Oentral Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 592
[189 P. 445] ; Smith v. Royal Mfg. Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 315,
323 [8 Cal.Rptr. 417]; Folden v. Lobrovich, 171 Cal.App.2d
627, 629 [341 P.2d 368] ; Hanlon Drydock etc. Co. v. G. W.
McNear, Inc., 70 Cal.App. 204, 214 [232 P. 1002]; see 5
Corbin on Contracts, § 1133, pp. 602-603), it is significant that
the parties expressly provided for liquidated damages in the
event of a breach by defendants but did not so describe the
right to retain the note in the event of a breach by plaintift's.
Nor did they provide that the retention and collection of the
note should be the exclusive remedy in damages against plaintift's. (Of., Royer v. Oarter, 37 Cal.2d 544, 546-547 [233 P.2d
539]; see Hetland, Oalifornia Land Contract, 48 Cal.L.Rev.
729,744-745; 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1061, p. 297.) [6] It
is true that the amount of the note was less than 5 percent of
the purchase price and that there was evidence that at the
time the contract was made "it would be impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." (Civ. Code,
§ 1671; see McOarthy v. Tally,46 Cal.2d 577, 586 [297 P.2d
981]; Ohastain v. Belmont, 43 Cal.2d 45, 58 [271 P.2d 498] ;
Better Food Markets v. American Dist. Tel. 00., 40 Cal.2d
179, 185 [253 P.2d 10, 42 A.L.R.2d 580].) There was other
evidence, however, that the value of the land was expected
to increase with the passage of time. It might be inferred
therefrom that the parties did not contemplate that defendants would suffer any damages if they were subsequently
required to resell their property and that therefore the amount
of the note did not represent a reasonable endeavor to estimate
the probable damages in the event of plaintift's' breach. (See
McOarthy v. Tally,46 Ca1.2d 577, 586 [297 P.2d 981] ; Rice v.
Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 589].)
It thus appears that whether the parties intended the
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provision for the retention of the note to be one for liquidated
damages to the exclusion of the damages that would otherwise
be recoverable and, if so, whether the requirements of Civil
Code section 1671 were met, were questions of fact that it
was incumbent on defendants to present to the trial court for
resolution. Since they did not do so, the judgment cannot be
reversed on the theory that the payment of the note constituted liquidated damages. (See Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal.
2d 337, 340-341 [303 P.2d 738J ; Ward v. Taggart, 51 Ca1.2d
736, 742 [336 P.2d 534J ; Burdette v. Rolle/son Oonstruction
00.,52 Ca1.2d 720, 725-726 [344 P.2d 307J.)
[7] Plaintiffs appeal from the part of the judgment
allowing defendants a deduction of $750 that defendants paid
to a real estate broker in connection with the sale and from
the part of the judgment denying interest from the date that
the escrow was terminated. They contend that since defendants resold the property without the assistance of a broker,
they were saved the expense of a second broker's fee and that
therefore they should not be allowed to deduct the broker's
fee for the first sale from the amount paid by plaintiffs on the
note. There is no merit in this contention, for defendants, not
plaintiffs, are entitled to the benefit of any savings defendants
effected by reselling their property without the assistance of a
broker. (See Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [216 P.2d
13].)
[8] Plaintiffs contend that their right to recover the
excess of the payments over the damages suffered by defendants became fixed when defendants terminated the escrow
and that therefore they should recover interest on the excess
from that date. Civil Code section 3287 provides that" Every
person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable
of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover
which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also
to recover interest thereon from that day. . . ." Since the
value of the property on which the extent of the damages
depended (see Civ. Code, § 3307) was not certain and could
not be made certain by calculation (Kingsbury v. Arcadia
Unified School Dist., 43 Ca1.2d 33, 43-44 [271 P.2d 40];
Ooughlin v. Blair, 41 Ca1.2d 587, 604 [262 P.2d 305] ; Lineman
v. Schmid, 32 Ca1.2d 204, 212-213 [195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.2d
1380]), interest did not become payable until the parties
stipulated to that value on October 16, 1958. (Lineman v.
Schmid, 32 Ca1.2d 204, 210 [195 P.2t1 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380] ;
Gray v. Bekins, 186 Cal. 389,399 [199 P. 767].) Accordingly,
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the trial court erred, not in failing to award interest from
the date the escrow was closed, but in awarding it from the
date the action was brought.
The judgment is modified to provide that plaintiffs shall
recover interest on the principal sum of $13,032.75 from
October 16, 1958, instead of from January 24,1958. As so modified the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own
costs on these appeals.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The contract involved in this
litigation was freely entered into by competent parties who
negotiated at arms length and plainly knew what they were
doing and understood the terms of the agreement concerning
the $15,000 promissory note, its payment, and the specification
of the items of consideration to each.
It is not a proper function of this court to remake the
contract, amend it, or reevaluate the elements of consideration to the respective parties. The $15,000 mentioned represented the consideration demanded by defendants and agreed
to be paid (and actually paid, with interest) by plaintiffs
for the very act of defendants' entering into an obligation
which for a substantial period of time, among other things:
(1) gave to plaintiffs a valuable right which they had not
therefore possessed; (2) impaired defendants' title and their
right freely to use or dispose of their land; and (3) only on
the terms specified, including compensation for the detriment
so suffered by defendants, further obligated them to sell and
convey their land to plaintiffs. On the undisputed facts, both
in law and in justice, defendants are entitled to retain the
money paid as consideration for that detriment. The mere
fact that mUltiple items and elements are aggregated in the
contract to constitute consideration to the respective parties
does not authorize the trial court or this court to disregard
or strike down any of these items or elements as inconsequential to either party.
Moreover, as conceded in the majority opinion (ante, p.
519-520), even if we regard the contract as providing for liquidated damages, it is presumptively valid and there is no
showing of illegality. The amount of the note paid by plaintiffs and retained by defendants was less than 5 percent of
the total purchase price and was negotiated in view of the
length of the escrow. In addition to the hazard to defendants
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of keeping the land off the market for six months, there was
evidence that at the time the agreement was made the parties
knew that the value of the land might be affected by current
exploration for oil, the selection of a location for a contemplated freeway, and the general trend from agricultural to
commercial and residential uses of land in the area. Thus, not
. only was the amount to be retained by defendants shown to be
-reasonable, but it is also established that "it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." (Civ.
Code, § 1671.) The validity of a liquidated damage provision
is, of course, to be determined as a matter of law in the light
of the facts kno,\'n and unknown at the time the agreement
was made. (McCarthy v. Tally (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 577, 586587 [10, 12] [297 P.2d 981] ; Chastain v. Belmont (1954),43
Ca1.2d 45, 58 [10] [271 P.2d 498] ; Better Food Markets v.
American Disi. Tel. Co. (1953),40 Ca1.2d 179, 185 [8] [253
P .2d 10, 42 A.L.R.2d 580].) So tested, the agreement here is
valid on any reasonable view of the facts.
To require owners who receive a reasonable down payment
pursuant to a valid contract to sell their land, to thereafter
await the possibility of facing a court judgment that they
refund the down payment upon the mere caprice of the buyer
who changes his mind and breaches his contract-thus having
extracted a valuable consideration but actually having given
nothing of value in return-would seem also to mean that
the down payment becomes of little value in the hands of
sellers, who perforce must preserve it in the form of liquid
money on pain of having other assets levied on and sold at
execution on the judgment in favor of the defaulting buyer.
This is plainly not justice, nor should it be the law; yet it
appears but to accent a trend in decisional law. (See Freedman v. The Rector (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 16, 18-19, 22-23 [230
P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1] ; see also Jot'dan v. Talbot (1961),
55 Ca1.2d 597, 611 [12 Ca1.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20].) It
would seem also that a further and more far reaching effect
of the instant judgment may well be to encourage other
persons to breach their obligations whenever it may appear
profitable, convenient, or otherwise desirable to them so to do.
I would reverse the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September
20, ]96]. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

